28
04
2008
Web 2.0 Expo: Casual Privacy
Posted by: Geoff in Critical Mass, Technology, Travel, tags: california, flickr, privacy, san francisco, web 2.0 expoLast session of the conference. And yes, another Schill recommendation. But this one I wanted to go to as well. We always have this problem — how to let people know something is private without the fear of “unauthorised” access.
Sadly, Kellan’s slides exploded just prior to the session, so we see an Apple-like presentation sans imagery.
Presenter: Kellan Elliott-McCrea, Flickr
- Sharing/privacy two sides of the same coin
- Casual privacy is a design pattern for doing sharing
- Can’t replicate the human experience in software, so we’re not even going to try
- Software needs to have the experience of whispering at a party
- Security through Obscurity++
- It’s make of (unguessable) URLs
- Sharing vs. Privacy — why do we care?
- We’re on information overload
- We share to try get over all that
- “Outboard brain”
- Participate in the wisdom of crowds; collective wisdom
- Basic models:
- Share nothing
- Total privacy is a fire suppression technique (aka it doesn’t work; one minor spark and you’re screwed)
- We need a leaky privacy model (for the 99.5% of us who don’t need total privacy)
- Share everything
- There are some things people should not be sharing (kids, home, last night’s party)
- Manage a crowd
- Signing up people, adding people, assigning permissions
- Leads to social fatigue
- Massive cognitive burden
- Human internal patterns are incompatible with the web
- Casual privacy
- Unguessable (but unprotected) URL for the purposes of sharing
- Only the author can create one for their own content
- URLs are neat (have neat properties); email, blog, IM, list, etc.
- Whispers are forwardable, which means the URL is effectively the same
- Whispers are deniable, so how do you do this with URLs?
- “Beneficial hypocracy”
- URLs need to be opaque, non-identifiable and unable to map it
- No identifying error messages
- No obvious gaps
- Share nothing
- Casual privacy works because of context
- Leaks happen not maliciously
- Give enough people enough information, and they’ll understand why it’s important
- Deniability also supported through revoking
- Removes the guest pass to see something previously allowed
- GPs could be used as REST targets
- Possible to pre-sign URLs and expiry (less casual privacy, BTW)














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